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Oftentimes, the most lasting evidence left behind by an 
expedition of monumental size is not physical, but literary. Such is the 
case with Julius Caesar’s Commentarii de Bello Gallico. Caesar’s 
account of the Gallic Wars is by far the most well-known and widely 
read version of the Gallic conflict, giving us a clearer understanding of 
the battlefield tactics and campaign strategies Caesar employed while 
fighting in Gaul than we can glean from other references in literature 
(e.g. Cassius Dio, Plutarch, and Velleius Paterculus) or the 
archaeological record alone. However, physical evidence cannot be 
considered any less important. Remains of weapons, banners, horns, 
and camp items have all been found from various battle sites along the 
path Caesar cut through Gaul, and these items help those interested 
in visualizing the campaigns in their heads. Furthermore, from 
physical remains, reconstructions can be created, either rudimentary 
or more polished. Film is perhaps the most familiar and gripping of 
the media for visualizing the physical and emotional reality of ancient 
warfare, as it relates what we can see and feel with our physical 
senses to what we can imagine with our minds. 
And yet, beyond film there is a platform that combines both 
literary and physical evidence. This is hyper-reality, the recreation of 
the physical world that places the learner inside the subject of study 
and immerses them not only through the compelling cinematography 
found in film, but also gives them choice, which is totally unique to 
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hyper-reality. Choice is what truly allows for analytical participation 
on the part of the learner and teaches through first-hand experience, 
rather than second-hand. It allows the learner not only to view the 
chain of events that led to an outcome such as the initial pacification 
of Gaul by the Romans in 52 BCE, but to also enact it, albeit in a 
simplified form. Instead of readers or viewers, learners can become 
players and conquerors or the vanquished. Delivering this choice to 
the learner is the one of the truest aims of this thesis. 
This concept can be connected with the idea of ‘Meaningful 
Play’, explained in Salen and Zimmerman’s Rules of Play. As they 
point out, “The goal of successful game design is the creation of 
meaningful play,” (Salen and Zimmerman, 33). What this essentially 
means is that if a game is worth playing and not frivolous with respect 
to the function of learning, it must be able to deliver some sort of 
meaning that connects with the player’s intelligence. The question 
now is how we derive meaning from a game. Salen and Zimmerman 
address this by breaking down meaning into two separate, but equally 
necessary parts. The first is discernibility. This means that the player 
is able to see and recognize what they need to do to play and win the 
game. In chess, the player can only win if s/he can discern the possible 
moves s/he can make and which s/he cannot, given the limitations of 
the board and the legal moves of each piece. Without this order and 
organization in a game, it is impossible to derive any kind of meaning. 
The second component of meaningful play is integration. This is the 
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how the player connects their actions to the game environment. The 
opening moves of chess set up the middle phase of the game, which, in 
turn, sets up the late-game, and finally, its conclusion. Extrapolating 
this to our game-like visualization about Caesar’s Siege of Alesia, we 
can see that for the player to really learn anything, they must be given 
this discernibility and integration; that is, they must be able to 
recognize their possible actions and how each action is constrained by 
and affects the broader context of the game—the terrain, the enemy 
army, and their own army. By doing this, they are creating 
meaningful and memorable play within the context of the Gallic Wars. 
A guiding assumption of this thesis is that this hands-on approach of 
learning by doing with a high emphasis on choice can be valuable to 
the modern student.  
To better understand the Gallic Wars, it will be helpful to take 
a specific event from the campaigns and focus on it in close detail, 
attempting to gain insight from one event and generalize it to others. 
Therefore, the focus of this thesis will be the Siege of Alesia, which 
will be used for several different reasons. First, it can be considered 
the climax of the Gallic Wars because it was the first and last time 
Gaul rose up in a unified revolt against the Romans. Furthermore, it 
is the finale of the most literary of the books in de Bello Gallico (Book 
VII), meaning that its tone is much more akin to that of a story than 
the cut-and-dried lists of events found in other books. Book VII also 
has the greatest number of instances of direct speech in any book of de 
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Bello Gallico (four; in sections 20, 38, 50, and 77), and seems to flow 
directly from event to event, with each building upon the next. The 
final book and fight for Gaul, more than any other book in de Bello 
Gallico, seems to come alive with drama. As Kahn says, “Among the 
Commentaries Book 7 of the Gallic Wars is distinguished by the strong 
sense of dramatic unity that strikes the reader,” (Kahn, 249). The 
dramatic quality of this book, in turn, allows us to better pull apart 
what Caesar says and claims to do, and reshape how we look at the 
veracity of Caesar’s accounts.  
While there were many different factors at play in Caesar’s 
decision-making process, the most central, and often most neglected 
by historians, is the amount of information that was available to him 
through the various communication channels of ancient warfare. This 
thesis will explore Caesar’s ability to judge, formulate, and enact 
tactics and strategies based on the reports he heard, maps he was 
drawn, and landscapes he could see. Caesar could not have had a 
satellite map in his head, but it is reasonable to suggest that he 
created a ‘mental map’, storing hills, valleys, and strongholds in his 
mind, simultaneously attaching various tribes and alliances to the 
map, and even further, attaching various personalities to those tribes 
and locations—all in a culture and land that was unfamiliar to him, 
and often hostile. 
To open this tentative window into Caesar’s thought-world as a 
general, we will do what he could only dream of, and create a 3D 
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interactive model of Alesia, complete with terrain and foliage, through 
which we can try to understand better Caesar’s relationship to the 
terrain and how it shapes his decisions. Within this model, we can 
assume the views of both an eagle flying over the battlefield and the 
view of a soldier standing anywhere on the map. What Caesar says he 
did, and how (and even why), will be compared with what seems 
possible and plausible given our digital reconstruction. It may turn 
out that Caesar was a bit more ‘in the dark’ than he presents himself 
in his prose, and is therefore perceived by his readers today. 
Before we can grapple with the reconstruction, however, it is 
necessary to provide a brief summary of de Bello Gallico leading up to 
the Battle of Alesia. 
A Brief Summary of the Gallic Wars 
The starting point of Caesar’s involvement with Gaul can be 
said to be the death of Metellus Celer in 59 B.C.E., who was the 
governor of Transalpine Gaul, a province of the republic. Caesar was 
then appointed the proconsulship of the province, adding it to his two 
current territories, Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum. He then received 
reports that his province was being endangered by the migration of 
the Helvetii through the area. Thus Caesar left Rome for Gaul and 
war. 
 As it turned out, the Helvetii tribe wished for a peaceful 
migration through Transalpine Gaul, and sent an emissary to discuss 
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the possibility of transit through the province. Caesar, however, 
stalled the negotiations for roughly fifteen days, and during this time, 
had his troops build a sixteen foot high defensive wall and a matching 
trench that went on nineteen miles in order to stop the Helvetii from 
crossing into his province, a premonition of his willingness to use 
large-scale Roman constructions to control terrain. Caesar then told 
the returning emissary that no passage would be allowed to the 
Helvetii, and that any attempt to pass would be met with force (1.8). 
After a few unsuccessful attempts, the Helvetii took a northern route 
west, but were chased by Caesar, who believed it dangerous to have a 
tribe hostile to the Roman people so close to a region both unprotected 
and rich in grain. After they had crossed Sequani territory and 
pillaged the lands of the Aedui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges, 
Gallic tribes friendly to Rome, Caesar caught the last fourth of the 
Helvetii crossing the River Arar (the modern day Saône River) and 
defeated them in battle (1.12). Afterwards, Caesar built a bridge 
spanning the Arar and pursued the remainder of the Helvetii until 
battle was met outside the town of Bibracte, where the Romans 
decisively defeated the Helvetii.  
This conflict has been related in detail because it gives us a 
good chance to examine Caesar’s motivation for going to war. While he 
tries to pass off the Helvetii as the main reason he had gone to Gaul in 
the first place, it is well-known that Caesar had his own reasons. 
According to Wyke, campaigning in Gaul was an activity that  
  
9 
“…gave him the chance gradually to build fresh 
and substantial political support within a devoted army 
while continuing, through his agents, to sustain his 
plebeian support at Rome. War in Gaul could also 
consolidate his reputation not as the leader of a faction 
of Rome, but as the commander of Rome’s troops 
abroad…” (Wyke, 42).  
Caesar was certainly hungry for power in the Roman political 
arena, but his desire to invade Gaul also had factional reasons. Under 
Caesar’s auspices during his first consulship, Publius Claudius 
Pulcher had been allowed to serve as a tribune, an office reserved for 
the plebeian class, although he was a patrician. Caesar facilitated this 
by allowing Claudius to formally leave the patrician caste and enter 
that of the plebeian. Claudius was changed to Clodius, reflecting the 
lower-class pronunciation of his name, and thereafter, Clodius served 
the political needs of Caesar, waging political wars with his enemies, 
such as Cicero and Cato the Younger. However, Clodius’ change of 
status to the plebeian class was technically illegal, only carried out 
because Caesar was able to pull the necessary religious strings as 
pontifex maximus despite the objections of Cicero and Cato regarding 
his authority to carry out this action without the approval of the 
Senate. Furthermore, Clodius had enacted several grain laws in 
accordance with Caesar’s wishes that Cicero had declared illegal, 
based on the invalidity of Caesar’s consular power. Although Caesar 
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was using Clodius to fight his political battles in Rome, he knew that 
he needed to be successful in Gaul to win power in the eternal city. 
Gelzer states,  
“His (Caesar’s) affairs were being managed by 
Clodius, whose moods were incalculable, and whose very 
tenure of office was grounded in illegality. The 
performance of great deeds in Gaul was, therefore, not 
just a matter of ambition but a question of self-
preservation. On the path he had entered inactivity 
meant ruin. Only if he returned much stronger would he 
be able to win through,” (Gelzer, 101). 
A final motivation for Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul was a 
monetary one. As Herm states, by 58 B.C.E., Caesar had  
“… repeatedly had to flee from his political foes 
and had married three times, studied in academies, had 
countless love-affairs, fought in the front line, led 
campaigns, been involved in intrigue and, more than 
anything else, got himself into debt,” (Herm, 165). 
The bills of his consulship were great, and Caesar knew he 
needed a quick and substantial source of income. Although Caesar 
claims that he was just interested in the defense of Transalpine Gaul, 
this reasoning does not hold up as he continues to chase the Helvetii 
across the Arar River well after the safety of the province seems 
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secure. Caesar is found here in the early books of de Bello Gallico to do 
what he will do many more times before the end of it: putting himself 
in the best possible light, while being less than impartial to his 
enemies. This is squarely because de Bello Gallico had a purpose, and 
that was to spread the exploits of Caesar to the people of Rome and 
cultivate his popularity. 
After Caesar’s actions against the Helvetii, he moved against 
the Germanic tribes and the tribes of the Belgae, most notably the 
Nervii. Once they had been defeated, he faces off against the Veneti, a 
seafaring tribe located in southern Armorica (near present-day 
Normandy), and even crosses over the English Channel into Britannia 
(Books IV and V). Several years pass while Caesar works to pacify 
Gaul, conquering new peoples and simultaneously quelling rebellions 
in newly-established territory. After believing he had totally quieted 
Gaul, Caesar went back to Italy to hold assizes. It was then that the 
“Great Revolt” (Goldsworthy, 315) erupted, triggering the greatest 
campaign of the Gallic Wars. 
Alesia: The Final Push 
Certainly the climax of the Gallic Wars was the Battle of 
Alesia, which occurred in 52 BCE. During this year, the Averni rose 
up under the leadership of Vercingetorix, a young Gallic nobleman, 
and posed to Caesar one of greatest challenges. This final campaign 
distinguishes itself from Caesar’s earlier ventures in Gaul because of 
the political climate. Gaul was a very different place during the Great 
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Revolt, because it seems that for the first time, the Southern 
Celtic/Gallic tribes like the Aedui, Sequani, and the Arverni realized 
the Romans had not come to their lands to fight the Helvetii, and then 
return to their lands in Transalpine Gaul. They had come to stay in a 
much more permanent sense. Although Caesar fought the campaign 
with a few allied tribes, such as the Boii, Remi and Lingones, the 
Aedui, who had been the most faithful of Rome’s tribal allies, were 
persuaded to join the unified Gallic confederation after Vercingetorix’s 
initial campaign successes. Therefore, Gaul would have certainly 
seemed to offer no safe place for Caesar and his men in 52 B.C.E. 
Roman traders had been slaughtered in Cenabum and all Gaul was 
hostile to Caesar. 
Vercingetorix himself merits a character study here simply 
because of the way Caesar portrays him. He is different from the 
common Gaul—more sophisticated, more Romanized, more Caesarian. 
As Rawlings observes, as described by Caesar, the Gauls can be 
recklessly and rapidly aroused to war, but do not have the staying 
power of the Romans, making them fickle allies. They are sudden and 
spasmodic in their plans and overall, a rash people. (Rawlings, 177). 
Vercingetorix departs from this model, as he is firm in his decision-
making, calculating, and patient, as was the case when he waited for 
the reinforcements at Alesia, enduring starvation and forcing the 
women and children out of the city because they are simply more 
mouths to feed. The Gallic leader is also said to do things swiftly 
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(celeriter), an attribute Caesar often uses to describe himself. Instead 
of offering decisive battle out on a plain, Vercingetorix harries the 
Romans, trying to limit their access to food and water with his 
numerically superior force of cavalry. It could be said that 
Vercingetorix’s mental map of Gaul is superior to Caesar’s, and he 
(Caesar) admits that by modelling Vercingetorix after himself. 
Vercingetorix is also described as a capable speaker. In 7.20, 
Vercingetorix denies accusations of treacherously colluding with 
Caesar in exchange for a kingship over Gaul, in a clear and logical 
speech, answering the first four counts of his indictment in order, and 
passionately denying any desire to receive the kingship of Gaul from 
Caesar. As Charles T. Murphy states in The Use of Speeches in 
Caesar’s Gallic War, “This first-rate speech meets with immediate 
approval: the assembled Gauls acquit him by raising a great clamor 
and by clashing their weapons together,” (C.T. Murphy, 123). In 
conjunction with his speaking abilities, Vercingetorix also possesses a 
knack for crafty diplomacy As Paul R. Murphy says, “It was often 
oratione subdola (subtle oration) that chieftains were persuaded to 
join the revolt,” (P.R. Murphy, 242). Being able to use his words to 
entice others to his way of thinking is possibly his greatest similarity 
to Caesar, to whose ability for persuasive “objective” prose de Bello 
Gallico stands as a testament. In fact, one of Caesar’s only set-backs 
in the de Bello Gallico is the Battle of Gergovia, in which 
Vercingetorix hands the proconsul a defeat that takes the lives of 
almost 700 men. 
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The Battle of Gergovia is of particular interest simply because 
it shows how Caesar represents defeat with his prose. According to 
Caesar, he had instructed his centurions to keep their men in check 
and not let them advance too close to the town of Gergovia because 
Caesar knew the terrain would heavily favor the Gauls and victory 
would be hard to achieve. Therefore, Caesar called a halt of the army 
outside the city. However, his writings tell us that only the Tenth 
Legion heard the trumpet blast signaling a halt, and the rest of the 
legions advanced towards the city. Then, Lucius Fabius, a centurion of 
the Eighth Legion, spurred his troops on to take Gergovia, eager to get 
at the plunder of the city. Once close to the city, Vercingetorix’s troops 
are able to engage the Romans and pull them into battle. The battle 
does not seem to be absolutely calamitous for Caesar, but almost 700 
men are lost on the field (Hammond, 172). Rather than taking the 
defeat as a fair one, Caesar blames first his trumpets, something out 
of his control, and then one of his centurions for being too greedy for 
booty and plunder. 
Sed elati spe celeris victoriae et hostium fuga et 
superiorum temporum secundis proeliis nihil adeo 
arduum sibi esse existimaverunt quod non virtute 
consequi possent, neque finem prius sequendi fecerunt 
quam muro oppidi portisque appropinquarunt. 
“But the men, elated by the hope of a speedy 
victory and the flight of the enemy, and the favorable 
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battles of previous times, thought nothing was of such 
sheer difficulty to them that they would not be able to 
accomplish it by their valor, and they did not cease their 
pursuit before they had approached the wall and the 
gates of the city.”1 
Furthermore, it was Caesar who is able to ‘see’ that the legion 
is in trouble. In 7.49. Caesar relates that he recognized that his men 
were in a disadvantageous position, and therefore sent a legate to 
gather men from the camp and reinforce the soldiers already engaged. 
Caesar reports on this battle with the same style that he employs for 
every battle in de Bello Gallico—with the cool confidence of an all-
knowing and victorious general. He would present himself to his 
audience as a general who may be betrayed by his over-zealous troops, 
but not by his own judgement.  
The final stage of the campaign against Vercingetorix took 
place in what is now a village of central France called Alise-Sainte-
Reine. Caesar chased Vercingetorix to the oppidum (fortified town) of 
Alesia and laid siege to the town, building a wall (contravallation) 
around the entire fort to starve the Gauls out. Next, there was a 
cavalry skirmish between Vercingetorix’s horsemen, supposedly 
numbering 15,000, and Caesar’s Germanic mercenary cavalry, in 
which the Germans utterly routed the Gauls and, “… pursued them 
                                                          
1 All translations of de Bello Gallico are my own. 
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eagerly right up to their ditch and wall. Massive slaughter ensued as 
some of the Gauls abandoned their horses and tried to cross the ditch 
and climb over the wall” (7.70). It is after this engagement that 
Vercingetorix decides to send all of his cavalry away by night to collect 
reinforcements to come to Alesia and break the siege. The Gauls 
answered the call and we are told that this Gallic relief force was led 
by Commius and Vercassivellaunus, supposedly contained over 80,000 
horsemen and 250,000 foot soldiers, and approached Alesia from the 
south. It should be noted, however, that it is likely that either Caesar’s 
information as to the number of troops in the relief force was 
incorrect, or he deliberately inflated this figure (Goldsworthy, 338). 
Henige expands on the possibility for inflation and claims it was done 
for the purpose of giving credence to the inevitability of Roman 
victory, saying,  
“… warfare is envisaged as the triumph of the 
godliness and civilization, as represented by the few, 
over godlessness and barbarism, represented by 
numberless and faceless masses. In this scenario the 
odds become so great that victory can be nothing less 
than the implacable verdict of fortune. And the greater 
the odds, the more sure the sign,” (Henige, 228). 
Of course, similar inflation appears in many pre-modern 
battles from various cultures, so it is most likely safe to say that while 
there were many Gauls in the reinforcing army, there were not 
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250,000. Most modern estimates place this figure around 100,000 
men—still a formidable fighting force. In any case, Caesar therefore 
built a second wall outside of the first (circumvallation) in order to 
fend off this new army of reinforcements. Taken together, the battle-
lines were of great dimensions—the Romans had built roughly 25 
miles in the combined length of the two walls around the central 
oppidum of Alesia. Towers, barricades, and traps were built to keep 
Vercingetorix away from the Roman walls. Just when things truly 
begin to look desperate for the Gauls and they decide to force all non-
military personnel out of the city to save food, the relief force arrives. 
Two more failed Gallic skirmishes follow before the final assault by 
the Gauls on the Roman siege works, from within and without. It was 
noted by the Gallic relief force that there was a portion where the 
River Ose north of Alesia obstructed the construction of any walls at 
the foot of Mt. Rea. As Dennison states, the lines at the foot of Mt. Rea 
were, by far, the weakest parts of the Roman defense (Dennison, 142). 
It was here that they attempted to overwhelm the Romans by 
simultaneously attacking from the within the city and to the 
northwest, led by Vercassivellaunus and 60,000 picked men. It was a 
hard-fought battle, requiring Caesar himself to lead troops into battle 
and rally his men, but the Romans were finally able to stave off the 
Gauls, and Vercingetorix eventually surrendered. Although this battle 
was followed by mopping-up actions over the next year, Alesia can be 
considered the definitive moment of the Gallic Wars, the action that 
finally subdued Gaul’s independence. The outcome of this battle, or 
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rather siege, was that all of Gaul was brought under Roman control 
and Caesar, already a powerful member of the first triumvirate (now 
just two, after the death of Crassus at the battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE 
against the Parthians), furthered his military reputation and his 
political influence in Rome, eventually leading to his conflict in civil 
war with Pompey the Great (with whom his relationship had become 
strained after the death of Julia, Caesar’s daughter and Pompey’s 
wife) and his assassination in 44 BCE. 
From antiquity to the present day, most historians have 
regarded Caesar’s account as the complete truth, because he is, 
without a doubt, the foremost source on the conflict. As late as the 
1930s, even, Caesar was regarded as a strategic and tactical genius 
who was able to do the unexpected and unthinkable while still 
maintaining full control of his troops and reading every move the 
Gauls made with accuracy and clarity. Armstrong praises his military 
ability, saying, “In short, his common sense and his reasoning power, 
his knowledge of the psychology of his own men and of the enemy, and 
his subtle artifices left the enemy puzzled and beaten,” (Armstrong, 
293). 
As explained above in the introduction, the goal of this thesis is 
to gain at least a glimpse inside the heads of Caesar, Vercingetorix, 
and their men by using a 3D reconstruction of the terrain of Alesia.  
This will allow us to investigate, with the help of the digital model, not 
only the veracity of what Caesar does say, but also what he does not 
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say. It is possible that Caesar is not quite the general Armstrong 
thought, and that he, although ultimately victorious, was strategically 
out-thought by Vercingetorix, and this is glossed over in the writing. 
By enclosing himself in a stronghold like Alesia with a large 
reinforcing army on the way, Vercingetorix had placed Caesar 
between a rock and hard place; he knows Caesar cannot lift the siege 
because his authority would be gravely diminished in the case of 
failure to destroy the rebels in the revolt. Although the strain on the 
Gauls inside Alesia Gauls is great in terms of food and water, 
Vercingetorix could have surmised that it would not be much better 
for the Romans once the reinforcements arrive. Furthermore, the 
Gauls will have a superior numerical advantage, making things truly 
dire for the Romans. 
 While it is not likely that Caesar would have personally taken 
the time to survey the very large terrain of Alesia in detail, he most 
certainly had his scouts reconnoiter the grounds and create reports, 
which probably would have been assembled into a rough tactical map. 
Therefore, Caesar is essentially seeing through the eyes of his soldiers; 
he has an idea of the terrain, but is putting serious trust in his scouts. 
Illustrations of various views of Alesia can be found in the appendix, 
Figures 1-6. The process for scouting during the late republic consisted 
of exploratores (scouts) and speculatores (spies). As Southern says, the 
differences between these two groups were probably not great, with 
the same connotations attributed to them as in more modern times, 
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(Southern, 226). In 7.11, Caesar finds out per exploratores that the 
men of Cenabum were leaving the town; intelligence that spurred him 
into action and caused him to take the town. Therefore, Caesar 
certainly used the information of his informants to great effect and 
they played a crucial role in his strategic decisions. By creating a 
digital model, we have access to something like what Caesar was 
trying to get his scouts to create and what he envisions in his head, at 
least in coming to grips with the physical setting of the battle. Upon a 
closer reading of Book VII, it can be found that what Caesar is said to 
have done does not always mesh with what is possible or likely in 
terms of topography. Understanding these discrepancies will allow for 
greater insights into Commentarii de Bello Gallico. Before the digital 
model of the battle field is discussed, however, a preliminary overview 
of the siege-works is needed. 
An Overview of the Defenses of Alesia 
Differing from most siege battles throughout ancient history, 
the fields of Alesia held not one or two, but three walls. The first to be 
discussed is that of the Gallic oppidum. While Caesar does not offer a 
description of the actual Gallic walls at Alesia, he mentions that they 
exist in 7.69 and gives a description of Gallic walls in 7.23. 
Muri autem omnes Gallici hac fere forma sunt. 
Trabes derectae perpetuae in longitudinem paribus 
intervallis, distantes inter se binos pedes, in solo 
collocantur. Hae revinciuntur introrsus et multo aggere 
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vestiuntur: ea autem, quae diximus, inter valla 
grandibus in fronte saxis effarciuntur. His collocatis et 
coagmentatis alius insuper ordo additur, ut idem illud 
intervallum servetur neque inter se contingant trabes, 
sed paribus intermissae spatiis singulae singulis saxis 
interiectis arte contineantur. Sic deinceps omne opus 
contexitur, dum iusta muri altitudo expleatur. Hoc cum 
in speciem varietatemque opus deforme non est alternis 
trabibus ac saxis, quae rectis lineis suos ordines servant, 
tum ad utilitatem et defensionem urbium summam 
habet opportunitatem, quod et ab incendio lapis et ab 
ariete materia defendit, quae perpetuis trabibus pedes 
quadragenos plerumque introrsus revincta neque 
perrumpi neque distrahi potest. 
“All Gallic walls are made in this form, however. 
Timbers are laid out continuously in equal intervals, 
with a distance of two feet between them, on the ground. 
These are fastened inwardly and covered with much 
earth: meanwhile, those intervals mentioned are filled 
in front with large stones. To these, having been laid 
and joined, another order is added above, so that the 
same interval is maintained and the timbers do not 
overlap over each other, but the individual beams set at 
equal spaces are held tightly by the individual rocks 
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that have been pushed between them. Thus the whole 
work is put together in order, until the correct height of 
the wall is completed. This work is both not unattractive 
in sight or variety, with alternate timbers and stones, 
which keep their orders in straight lines; and at the 
same time has great scope in utility and defense of the 
city, because the stone defends from fire, and the timber 
from a ram, since the uninterrupted timbers, usually 
forty feet long, strengthened on the inside, are not able 
to be breached or pulled apart.” 
These Gallic walls were built sometime before the Battle of 
Alesia, and are therefore much more sturdy and permanent than the 
Roman walls. It should be noted that Caesar even praises the walls for 
their effectiveness and aesthetics. The Gauls also built a six foot wall 
and ditch on the slope of the hill facing east, but since the heaviest 
fighting of the battle took place to the west of the Gallic town, these 
defenses did not see significant action. It is possible, however, that 
Vercingetorix was attempting to attract Caesar to focus his defenses 
in the west—where the reinforcing army would be able to threaten 
their rear. 
The Roman walls are what really make this siege unique in the 
Gallic campaigns. As noted above, there were two Roman walls, one of 
contravallation intended to keep Vercingetorix and his men in, and 
one of circumvallation to keep Commius and his reinforcing army out. 
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The basic construction of the Roman walls was this: a glacis of earth 
and rampart were constructed, together measuring roughly 12 feet in 
height. The dirt for the earthen glacis was taken from two consecutive 
ditches dug directly in front of the glacis and rampart. As the defenses 
were put up ad hoc, the rampart would have been created from tree 
branches that were lashed together to make a palisade. Two such 
walls were created, with the Roman camps located between these 
walls. 
Just as important as the walls the Romans built, however, 
were the various traps they constructed to slow down, paralyze, or kill 
the Gallic warriors in their assault of the siege-lines. A diagram of the 
various traps at Alesia can be found in the appendix, Figure 7. As the 
Gallic warrior ran towards the Roman fortifications, he first would 
have encountered a ditch 400 feet from the Roman walls described in 
7.72. This first ditch was 20 feet deep, with perpendicular sides, so 
that the bottom was as wide as the top. Once the soldier crossed this, 
the first impediment he would have encountered is the stimulus, 
which literally translates to either goad, prick, spur, or more 
figuratively, anything used to speed something up (See Figure 8 in the 
appendix). Hammond, in her translation notes of Book VII, says this 
name was a bit of macabre soldier humor (Hammond, 241). Although 
spurs were normally used to speed up movement, as on a horse, these 
spurs were crippling to the Gallic advance. These stimuli were 
essentially barbed hooks designed to impale the foot of anyone who 
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stepped on it, with the barb hooking the foot so that disentangling 
oneself from the implement was extremely difficult and painful. In 
any case, if a soldier stepped on one of these, he was neutralized, yet 
there were plenty more traps to navigate, ditches to cross, and a 12 
foot wall to climb—all before engaging the legionaries at the top of the 
rampart. 
The next obstacle to be encountered by the Gaul was the field 
of lilia, or lilies. These were sharpened wooden stakes as thick as a 
man’s thigh that were tempered and dug into the ground so that only 
about three inches protruded from the ground. They were sunk into 
ditches tapering from the top to bottom, and were deployed in a 
quincunx pattern (the five side of a standard die) and were covered 
with brush and branches presumably stripped off of the tree trunks 
used for the palisade. This obscured the trap and forced the Gaul to 
move gingerly as he navigated the eight consecutive rows of lilia. The 
text claims that the men called these traps lilies because of their 
resemblance to the flower, another example of dark humor.  
The next line of defense for the Romans was the cippi. These 
were thick branches, sharpened at the top and dug into the earth in 
pits much like the lilia, but with more of the branch left protruding so 
that they could fully impale a man who fell on them. The lateral 
branches that divided off from the main, sharpened one were left to 
trip up the attacker as he moved through the trap. Cippi, when 
translated to English, means either ‘gravestone’ or ‘boundary-marker’, 
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or ‘mile-marker’. Again, the name seems to make light of the harm 
they would cause. It seems strange that these men, who were so used 
to death after years of campaigning under Caesar, would give these 
death-traps names that were either light-hearted or were meant to 
induce a bit of humor. However, I think it is possible that there could 
also be a psychological explanation behind this. The things these traps 
did to their victims were incredibly vicious—the spurs and lilies both 
had the possibility of crippling the man who stepped on them, not 
necessarily killing them, but destroying their chance to support 
themselves even if they did not die from the wounds.  In order to cope 
with knowingly inflicting chronic pain and a crippled life on another 
man, the legionaries were dramatizing the distance of the battlefield 
from everyday things like horse spurs, milestones, or lilies. As Scarry 
says of torturers in general, the Roman soldiers, who know the 
physical effects of their traps, know that these traps will cause their 
victims to 
“…retreat into the most self-absorbed and self-
experiencing of human feelings (pain, that is), when it is 
the very essence of these objects (the objects whose 
names have been reapplied to instruments of torture) to 
express the most expansive potential of the human 
being, his ability to project himself out of his private, 
isolating needs into a concrete, objectified, and therefore 
sharable world,” (Scarry, 9) 
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—in this case, the world of riding spurs, lilies, and milestones. 
An example Scarry shares that is similar to the traps of Alesia is how 
words like ‘oven’ and ‘shower’ take on an entirely new and sinister 
meaning when thought of in the context of Nazi Germany (Scarry, 9). 
The cippi were the last of the Roman traps placed outside the 
walls (both contravallation and circumvallation), but were not the last 
obstacles the Gauls had to pass before climbing the glacis and 
rampart. They still would have encountered two ditches before the 
glacis and rampart, 15 feet wide, with an estimated 2.4-2.7 meter 
depth. The one closest to the Gallic walls was filled with water 
diverted from the Ose and Oserain rivers. According to Keeley, 
Fontana, and Quick, the moat-like ditch filled with water was 
trapezoidal in shape, while the next (closest to the Roman walls) was 
V- shaped (Keeley, Fontana, and Quick, 59). Figure 9 shows these 
ditches in the appendix. Only after all of this could a Gallic warrior 
climb the rampart, which itself was lined with sharpened stakes at the 
top of the glacis, and hope to engage in hand-to-hand combat. So while 
we are not given casualty statistics for the soldiers killed or 
neutralized by the traps at Alesia, it is easy to understand that these 
defenses were key to the Roman victory. In fact, during the second of 
the two skirmishes before the final battle for Alesia, the time it takes 
the Gauls from inside the oppidum to fill in the ditches costs them the 
chance for real coordination with the outside forces attacking Caesar, 
as told in 7.82. 
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Creating a Digital Model of Alesia 
In order to better understand and critically investigate 
Caesar’s account of the Siege of Alesia, I have created a 3D model of 
the battle using the Unity game engine. The creation of the model 
involved both on-site research at Alise-Sainte-Reine, the modern day 
site of the battle, and extensive literary and web-based research. It is 
important to note, however, that for much of the 19th and 20th 
centuries, the exact location of the Battle of Alesia was in dispute. 
Gerhard Herm and Michael Dietler tell us that although the French 
village of Alaise was formerly considered the location of the battle, 
excavations paid for by the French emperor Napoleon III validated 
Alise-Sainte-Reine, roughly 191 kilometers to the west of Alaise, as 
the actual site of the siege described in de Bello Gallico. These 
excavations uncovered weapons of both Roman and Gallic origin, 
Roman-made traps, and even the 18-foot-wide ditch Caesar makes 
special note of in his writings (Herm, 193, Dietler, 589). Finally, 
further excavations led by Michel Reddé and Siegmar von Schnurbein 
from 1991-1997 confirm Alise-Sainte-Reine as the battle site. 
Concerning the likelihood of Alise-Sainte-Reine as the site of Alesia, 
Wells writes, “The work carried out in the 1990s should remove all 
doubt,” (Wells, 676).  In order to make sure the model was reasonably 
accurate, I used a plug-in for Unity called World Composer, which 
allowed me to extract satellite data from Microsoft’s Bing and create a 
base height map of Alesia and an area extending out beyond the 
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circumference of the Roman fortifications. Although there is some 
margin for error, owing to the fact that the resolution of the satellite 
data is 5-10 meters per pixel, this software workflow ensures us that 
the model’s topography is reasonably accurate for the time of Caesar. 
Although the area has been modernized with the construction of the 
small town of Venarey-Les-Laumes and Alise-Sainte-Reine, the hills 
still remain, unaffected by major landscaping work.  Although World 
Composer gave me a sufficiently accurate model of the terrain’s 
elevation and steepness, the foliage of the area had yet to be 
determined. While Caesar makes no mention of the different types of 
grass on the field, I was able to take photographs of the landscape 
during my time on-site and try to match my terrain to what I saw. To 
do this, I placed splat-maps (essentially visual representations of 
grass, mud, gravel or other substances) that also varied by elevation 
and steepness. A greater challenge was found in the tree placement on 
the model. The surrounding hills must have been substantially 
forested (as they are in part today), but because Caesar does not 
specify which areas on the battlefield surrounding Alesia were 
wooded, I decided to create foliage based on elevation. Since Alesia 
was an inhabited area, it is safe to assume that the large plain to the 
west of Alesia was cultivated and clear of trees. The river was most 
likely flanked by a fair amount of trees, some of which were probably 
cut down by Caesar’s men in order to build the palisades for the walls 
of circumvallation and contravallation. Most of the trees were placed 
on areas of the map with higher elevation, because these places were 
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least likely to be cultivated, and therefore had not been cleared by the 
inhabitants of the area. Because the Romans built roughly 25 miles of 
palisade, stumps, rather than trees, have been placed on the edges of 
the forests, along the rivers and in random places within the Roman 
camp. It should also be noted that the trees used in the model were 
chosen based on the most common types of trees in the area, as well as 
the best versions available from the Unity asset store. They were 
prefabricated, and not made from scratch. 
Building the walls was a challenge that was overcome using a 
combination of height map additions and subtractions in Terrain 
Composer (to create the glacis and ditches) and the Unity plug-in 
ProBuilder together with the 3D modeling program Cinema 4D that 
allowed me to create structures and then put a texture map that 
looked like a wooden palisade over them. In de Bello Gallico, Caesar 
tells us that he had his men construct an earthwork 12 feet high 
crowned by the palisade of wood. He does not, however, specify the 
height of the palisade itself. Again, then, I had to base my design on 
what was most likely, and also allow for variation. Therefore, while 
the height of the glacis is essentially uniform, the height of the wall 
varies randomly with different tree heights. 
The importance of this 3D model lies in the questions it allows 
us to explore regarding Caesar’s account of the Siege of Alesia in Book 
VII. Furthermore, it gives the learner a truer sense of what is was like 
to be at the battle—the size of the field, the extreme height 
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differences, and the views associated with them. By using this model, 
we can attempt to better see as Caesar did, and therefore think 
through his strategic, tactical, and experiential decisions with a new, 
hopefully more accurate, lens. 
 
Discrepancies with Caesar 
While in the general sense, Caesar’s writings can, and should, 
be recognized as an invaluable source, it is also possible to find 
disagreements between what the text says and what we can see with 
our digital model. The two questions below address, in the light of the 
3D model of the terrain, Caesar’s accuracy in terms of strategy and 
tactics. 
To a student casting a critical eye on Caesar’s account of the 
siege, one event that does not make sense is Vercingetorix’s decision to 
send away his entire force of cavalry to gather reinforcements 
throughout Gaul (7.64 gives the number 15,000 to the horsemen). 
Vercingetorix, priusquam munitiones ab Romanis 
perficiantur, consilium capit omnem ab se equitatum 
noctu dimittere. Discedentibus mandat ut suam quisque 
eorum civitatem adeat omnesque qui per aetatem arma 
ferre possint ad bellum cogant. 
“Vercingetorix, before the defenses were 
completed by the Romans, conceives a plan to send 
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away all his horsemen by night. He commands to the 
ones leaving that each should approach his own people 
and gather everyone of age able to bear arms for war.” 
 As reported by Caesar, Vercingetorix’s decision to send away 
all of his cavalry is certainly questionable. As Fuller observes, it must 
have seemed a gift from heaven when Caesar found out that all of 
Vercingetorix’s cavalry had left the field and surrounding area (Fuller, 
152). Would it not have been better to send at most a thousand to 
gather reinforcements and use the rest to harry the Roman foragers, 
thereby putting greater strain on Caesar’s already precarious 
logistical position? Given the terrain, with its hilly topography and 
wide-open spaces, it seems the Gallic cavalry could have carried out a 
major guerilla warfare-style operation on the Romans as they built the 
outer walls. Caesar tells us in 7.74 that both he and Vercingetorix only 
had grain and forage for 30 days, so harassing these supplies could 
have only helped Vercingetorix’s position, and Caesar was certainly 
afraid of being trapped between the two Gallic armies without food, 
forcing him to attempt to break through the siege-lines. A plausible 
objection to this line of reasoning is that earlier in the siege, we see 
Caesar’s German mercenary cavalry defeat the Gauls in mounted 
combat. Certainly the Gauls lost many horsemen, possibly thousands, 
in the skirmish detailed a few pages above, but Caesar does not 
specify the exact amount of casualties sustained by the Gauls. Clearly, 
though, Vercingetorix had enough to send for reinforcements. At the 
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same time, while it is possible that by sending all of the horsemen 
away, he was getting rid of mouths to feed, and thereby extending the 
time he could wait for the relief army, it must also be noted that 
Vercingetorix was also sending food away in the form of horseflesh. 
Furthermore, the Gauls were ready to consider cannibalism if 
Critognatus’ speech found in 7.77 can be given any credence. And 
while this speech was certainly invented for de Bello Gallico (although 
likely based on prisoners’ reports of the attitude in Alesia during the 
last days of the siege), it shows that there was not a surplus of 
thousands of horses to eat. Approached from any angle, then, 
Vercingetorix’s decision to send away all of his cavalry (as told by 
Caesar) is puzzling. 
Using our 3D model, we can take a closer look at the situation 
and speculate from a more informed position as to what actually 
happened at Alesia. Again, Caesar provides few details about the 
placement of trees at the site of Alesia, and the modern site has 
almost wholly been converted to farmland. However, he does tell us in 
7.69 that there is a three mile plain facing the town (located west of 
the fort), and we can assume that the tops of the various hills were 
wooded. In our model, we can see that Caesar’s siege-works were 
broken by the Ose and Oserain rivers. If these two rivers were not 
exclusively controlled by the Romans, then it would have been entirely 
possible for a host of cavalry to water and graze their horses to either 
the northwest, east, or southeast of Alesia. With Caesar’s men tied up 
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constructing the siege-works as well, it is probable that there existed 
little Roman control outside of the wall of circumvallation. Caesar also 
says in 7.74 that he had grain and forage for thirty days gathered so 
he would not have to leave camp for more food. This infers that at 
least a portion of the Gallic cavalry remained close, outside of the 
Roman walls and capable of harassing attempts to gather food.  
I have found the best reasoning for Vercingetorix sending all of 
his cavalry is that he was trying to get Caesar to finish his siege-lines, 
which seems very counter-intuitive at first. However, if Caesar was 
able to finish the walls—all 25 miles of them—he would certainly be 
more inclined to make his stand at Alesia, although surrounded by 
Gauls. Caesar knew Alesia was the make-or-break moment of the 
campaign, and after investing that much manpower, he could not just 
abandon it; his troops might lose faith and the walls would remain a 
testament to Caesar’s retreat and cowardice. Vercingetorix has very 
slyly trapped Caesar into staying and giving battle here. One could 
argue that if Vercingetorix could have coordinated action between the 
Gallic forces inside Alesia and those outside Caesar’s walls, he could 
have orchestrated a crushing victory for the Gauls. Instead, however, 
when the relief force arrives, they impatiently attack and 
Vercingetorix is forced to act according to their schedule. Caesar, on 
the other hand, may report that all the Gallic cavalry simply rode 
away in order to downplay the vulnerability of his own position. 
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Although all of these pieces of information might seem 
insignificant on their own, taken together as pointing toward what 
Caesar seems to have left unsaid, they are compelling. And while the 
digital model is not absolutely necessary to arrive at this conclusion, 
being able to visualize the map in this format certainly forces the 
student to think about the lay of the land and use this to view 
Caesar’s account in a more critical light. 
Another major problem with what Caesar tells us about the 
Battle of Alesia is that in the most critical stage of the battle, when all 
three fronts were engaged by the Gauls, Caesar dons his red cloak, his 
distinguishing mark, and personally enters the fray, strengthening 
the morale of the men and essentially saving the battle for the Roman 
troops. This raises serious questions, because we are also told in Book 
VII that the battle is won because Caesar was able to discern that the 
Gauls were open to a flanking maneuver by his Germanic cavalry, and 
then order that maneuver.  
Mittit primo Brutum adulescentem cum 
cohortibus Caesar, post cum aliis Gaium Fabium 
legatum; postremo ipse, cum vehementius pugnaretur, 
integros subsidio adducit. Restituto proelio ac repulsis 
hostibus eo quo Labienum miserat contendit; cohortes 
quattuor ex proximo castello deducit, equitum partem 
sequi, partem circumire exteriores munitiones et ab tergo 
hostes adoriri iubet. Labienus, postquam neque aggeres 
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neque fossae vim hostium sustinere poterant, coactis una 
XL cohortibus, quas ex proximis praesidus deductas fors 
obtulit, Caesarem per nuntios facit certiorem quid 
faciendum existimet. Accelerat Caesar, ut proelio 
intersit. 
 “Caesar first sent young Brutus with cohorts, 
and then, the legate Gaius Fabius with others; lastly, 
he, himself, when the fighting was most savage, led 
fresh troops for reinforcements. The battle restored and 
the enemies beaten back, he hurried to that place where 
he had sent Labienus; he led out four cohorts from the 
nearest fort, ordered part of the cavalry to follow him, 
part to go around the outer fortifications and assault the 
enemies in the rear. Labienus, after neither ramps nor 
trenches were able to stop the enemy, having collected 
40 cohorts together, which had come out of the nearest 
forts by chance, made certain to Caesar through 
messengers what he thought needed to be done. Caesar 
hurried, in order to get involved in the battle.” 
It is puzzling that most sources (all that I have found) seem to 
accept Caesar’s claim of both engaging in combat and ordering the 
charge without question or just skip to the effect of the cavalry charge 
without dissecting the logic behind it. For instance, Southern claims, 
somewhat implausibly, that generals like Caesar really were able to 
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appear everywhere at once, accomplishing multiple tasks at once 
(Southern, 202), while Rivet simply skips over the ordering of the 
charge and just cuts to the chase of the Gauls seeing cavalry in their 
rear, and fleeing in a mass rout (Rivet, 200). However, when looking 
at the map of the fighting, it can be seen that if Caesar was among his 
men at this critical junction in the battle, then he would simply not 
have had the view to see and order this maneuver. Figure 2 shows the 
view from the area where Caesar would have been if he were among 
his troops engaged in front of the northwest section of the 
fortifications and ordered a charge around the outside of the walls. He 
would have been on the lowest plain of the field, surrounded by 
shouting, fighting, and dying men, and, perhaps most importantly, 
would have been enclosed by the siege works that stood close to 
twenty feet tall. From this area, it is hard to believe that Caesar could 
see enough of the battlefield to formulate strategic decisions. In fact, 
the Gauls on the hill-top to the west of Alesia would have a far better 
view of the situation and the ability to counter Caesar’s actions. In his 
writing, Caesar claims he made his way to the location of fighting in 
which his legate Labienus commanded. This was the northwestern 
part of the siege works, where Vercassivellaunus was attacking. The 
next sentence states that he ordered one cohort of cavalry to follow 
him, and the rest to embark on the flanking attack. If Caesar had 
moved towards Labienus, a move down in terms of elevation, how was 
he able to see that the Gauls on the western plain were open to 
attack? One could propose that Caesar would have had various 
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messengers who would report to him and inform him of the developing 
aspects of the battle that he could not see, but as Southern states of 
Roman generals, it was most possible to report information and take 
orders to different contingents of the army if the general was in an 
established position in the rear of the battlefield, not leading from the 
front, as we are told Caesar does here (Southern, 203). Although not 
impossible, the chances of a messenger finding Caesar or seeing his 
signal on the move, in the midst of the most critical fighting of the 
siege, are not good. Instead, for Caesar to obtain this information, 
either by his own sight or by messenger, he would have had to have 
been stationed somewhere both with an expansive view and in a 
location that was accessible to messengers. Caesar offers a cryptic and 
compressed description of his headquarters in 7.85,  
Caesar idoneum locum nactus quid quaque ex 
parte geratur cognoscit; laborantibus summittit. 
“Happening upon a suitable place, Caesar 
perceives whatever is happening in any part; he aids 
those laboring.” 
Here is a major disagreement between Caesar’s writing and 
our digital model. As can be seen in Figure 1, which is the vantage 
point of Caesar’s probable headquarters, the battlefield was simply too 
large to be entirely encompassed in one view from any of the available 
altitudes. In terms of seeing the events of the siege unfolding in the 
west, however, Mt. de Flavigny, fits both of these requirements, as it 
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lies south of Alesia and would be the closest calm area to the points of 
attack that also has a high elevation. Furthermore, archeological 
evidence shows that the line of contravallation encompassed the upper 
reaches of Mt. de Flavigny, so this seems to be a likely location for 
Caesar’s command headquarters if one existed. With the help of our 
model built in Unity, we can see that Mt. de Flavigny has the 
elevation to provide a view of the western siege lines, as well as the 
expansive plain outside of it that held the masses of the Gallic 
reinforcements. We can also see with the model that there was a 
distance of roughly three kilometers between Mt. de Flavigny and the 
site of final combat in which Caesar was said to intervene. It could be 
said that since the fortifications were weakest in the northwest corner, 
Caesar might have expected an assault in this location and told his 
cavalry to be ready to charge. However, the account does not explicitly 
say this. Furthermore, the 60,000 men under Vercassivellaunus are 
said to have attacked the gap by surprise (7.83), making Caesar’s 
foreknowledge of an assault less likely. Putting all of this together, it 
seems close to impossible that Caesar was able to simultaneously fight 
in hand-to-hand combat and make this battle-saving tactical decision 
in the midst of combat. There are two possible paths to now pursue: 
that Caesar ordered the charge from a position with an adequate view, 
or that he did not because he was fighting with his men close to the 
River Ose. 
Caesar, the General 
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If we pursue the first view, Caesar plays a role in the battle 
more typical for generals of the time. Instead of going down among his 
own troops and putting himself into danger, he stays at his command 
headquarters on Mt. de Flavigny. From here, he is able to send and 
receive messages to and from centurions and mercenary captains who 
can then instruct their troops what actions need to be taken and at 
what time. Most importantly, from his vantage point on Mt. de 
Flavigny, Caesar could see the terrain that the flanking maneuver 
would have encompassed. Using our digital model, we can see the view 
Caesar would have had from his headquarters on Mt. de Flavigny. 
As Southern states,  
“Commanding from the rear allowed the general to 
observe the whole battle, or however much of it he could see 
from his position. Thus, he was enabled to decide how to deal 
with specific situations and to issue orders to the troops, 
perhaps sending in each section when it was called for, 
bringing in the reserves at threatened points, attempting an 
enveloping maneuver, or ordering the pursuit” (Southern, 203).  
This option seems favorable for two reasons besides the main 
one stated above. First, Caesar could readjust if he saw his charge fail. 
If he was down on the ground level with his troops, he would have 
been in a very difficult position, personally and strategically, if the 
cavalry flank attack were to be defeated. On Mt. de Flavigny, however, 
Caesar would have had more wiggle room to think up an alternative 
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strategy for conducting the battle should the flank attack fail. Second, 
there was of course the risk of bodily harm. Caesar was indisputably a 
master statesman, orator, and manipulator; even his generalship was 
prodigious. However, we have no reason to believe he was a master 
warrior. During the Battle of Alesia, he would have been 48 years old, 
past the prime of combat effectiveness. Furthermore, Caesar had 
much to lose, and throwing his life away in a battle where victory was 
a distinct possibility, and would carry with it tremendous political 
potential back in Rome, does not seem akin to the calculating 
measures traditionally (and accurately) associated with Caesar. 
Caesar, the Warrior 
The other option we are faced with is that Caesar did in fact 
engage in personal combat in the area of Vercassivellaunus’ attack in 
the northwest corner of the fortifications. There is, of course, the 
chance that he ordered the charge just as he was moving to engage the 
Gauls, which is what the Latin text suggests.  However, it would be 
very difficult to time the two actions so that Caesar would appear in 
the front lines just as the cavalry charge fell upon the Gallic rear.  If 
the timing was not precise, however, Caesar would be exposing 
himself to serious tactical and personal risk. Another, more likely 
option, is that when Caesar went down to his troops to bolster their 
morale and possibly ride into combat, someone else spotted the 
susceptibility of the Gauls, and ordered the cavalry to execute the 
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flanking maneuver. The obvious follow-up question to this is if it was 
not Caesar who ordered the charge, who was it? 
There are a few candidates for who might have ordered the 
charge, but since Caesar makes himself out to be the hero of the day, 
we do not find any explicit evidence of who it could be from de Bello 
Gallico. However, there are vague clues left by Caesar as to who might 
have remained at the command post after Caesar entered the battle 
(if, in fact, he did). In 7.81, we are told that his legates Gaius 
Trebonius and Marcus Antonius were stationed on the walls where 
Vercingetorix was attacking during a previous assault, so they were in 
the area, and could have possibly seen the opportunity to charge the 
Gallic flank from their higher position on the walls. It must also be 
noted that Antonius had commanded cavalry in the past (Plutarch, 
3.4). One might say that any centurion who saw the opening could 
have been the one who ordered the charge, but because centurions 
only had authority over their centuries, this is not a tenable solution. 
Also, when thinking about the cavalry in Book VII, it must be 
remembered that Caesar supplemented the Roman citizen cavalry 
with Germanic mercenaries, who were much better horsemen than the 
Romans. Therefore, it is entirely possible that the man who ordered 
the charge that saved the battle for the Romans was the commander 
of the Germanic cavalry, and was not even a Roman. If this is the 
case, we can understand how and why Caesar was able to take all of 
the credit for this decisive maneuver and not receive any backlash in 
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Rome. In the end, it appears either a legate (possibly Marcus 
Antonius) or cavalry commander who could have been a German 
mercenary ordered the charge if Caesar took part in the battle. 
Between these two options of Caesar either remaining at his 
headquarters and ordering the charge, or rushing into the fight and 
leaving a second-in-command at the headquarters who could have 
ordered the charge, I believe the first option is sounder, for the 
reasons listed above. Granted that great generals were often more 
aware of their surroundings than others and that charisma played a 
major part in the depiction of his (in our case, Caesar’s) battlefield 
mobility (Southern, 203), even he cannot be completely absorbed in 
the cutting edge of hand-to-hand battle and still have the emotional 
clarity and topographical vantage point to make strategic decisions, 
particularly about areas of the battlefield he cannot see. Furthermore, 
it certainly seems that Caesar was opening himself up to criticism 
back in Rome. Many of the elites in Roman society would have had 
their fair share of battlefield experience and it is likely they would 
have realized the contradiction Caesar had stepped into.  Although we 
may never be able to fully know what exactly happened in this 
instance, the realities of the terrain conflict with Caesar’s account, 
which would place him both in the battle directly and commanding it 
from a strategic perspective. This suggests that Caesar was willing to 





Focus: The Legionary  
As said above, it is the primary goal of this thesis to discover 
what Caesar has left unsaid in his writings. Something that is 
typically absent from his mainly strategic and tactical writing is the 
experience of his soldiers, the common legionaries. It is another, if 
secondary, goal of this thesis to explore how the soldiers interacted 
with this environment. One of the biggest realizations associated with 
trying to grasp this battle is the sheer amount of physical toil and 
labor involved in the construction of the siege-works and traps. To 
gather the necessary supplies for these constructions, the Romans had 
to thoroughly scour the entire area around Alesia for wood. This would 
have required extensive time spent on the outskirts of heavily wooded 
areas and Caesar’s men probably spent days getting to know the hills, 
trees, and rivers near Alesia. Although it can be assumed that many 
soldiers saw more of the actual terrain than Caesar, it is certainly not 
viable to say that they were afforded the same reports and maps from 
the scouts of the army. In that case, the common legionary probably 
had a very different mental map of the terrain than Caesar did. In 
this situation, we must ask the question as to what the legionary could 
actually see during the Battle of Alesia, and of course, the answer is 
complicated, and varies from soldier to soldier. 
However, we can divide our term ‘soldier’ up a bit to allow for 
more specialization and insight into what each experienced during the 
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siege. Caesar does a relatively poor job, as do most military historians 
of the age (Fuller, 76), of describing how his army was organized, 
trained, and supplied, presumably because this information was 
commonplace. However, because the Roman people were fairly 
conservative, most historians assume that Caesar’s army was not 
terribly different from his uncle Marius’ (Fuller, 76). Therefore, as had 
nearly all previous Roman armies, Caesar’s Roman troops were 
mainly comprised of legionaries, or infantry soldiers that fought with 
two throwing spears called pila, a short sword made for stabbing 
called a gladius, and occasionally, a wide-bladed dagger called a pugio. 
We can be sure the pila and gladius were used at Alesia because they 
are mentioned in de Bello Gallico. In the direst moments of the battle, 
Caesar says, “Nostri omissis pilis gladiis rem gerunt,” (7.88) “Letting 
go of their pila [throwing spears], our [troops] did the thing [the fight] 
with gladii [short swords].” 
While these were the probable arms the legionary in Caesar’s 
army, he also had a kit he carried daily. Josephus, writing in 69 A.D., 
in his Wars of the Jews, says,  
“the foot soldiers have a spear and a long buckler, 
besides a saw and a basket, a pick-axe and an axe, a thong of 
leather and a hook, with provisions for three days, so that a 
footman hath no great need of a mule to carry his burdens,” 
(Josephus, III, v, 5, Whiston, tr.). 
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 However, scholars like H.J. Edwards posit that this burden 
was unlikely, saying of the legionary,  
“On the march he carried his kit (sacrinae) and 
food in a bundle, on a crutch strapped to his shoulders—
called after its inventor mulus Marianus. The heavy 
baggage (impedimenta) was carried on pack-animals 
(iumenta), driven by camp followers (calones),” 
(Edwards, 604).  
Holmes notes that there is no mention of supply carts in the 
Gallic Campaigns, and estimates that each legion probably employed 
500 or 600 mules to carry the baggage, (Holmes, 120). However, 
Edwards disagrees, saying, 
“There is no actual evidence that wheeled transport was 
used by the Romans in the Gallic War; but it is not impossible 
that, where the roads were good enough, native carts may have 
been requisitioned for the purpose,” (Edwards, 604).  
In any case, the burden of the legionary was great in terms of 
physical stress, both in and out of combat. 
During the time of Caesar, military men were required to serve 
a 10 year period, although it is possible that many soldiers were 
retained by the late republic/early empire before the systems of 
discharge had been properly established (Southern, 99). It should be 
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noted that men frequently volunteered for longer service due to 
increased prestige and position, as was the case for Spurius 
Ligustinus, a legionary who became a soldier in 204 B.C., and served 
22 years, fighting in the campaigns of Macedon, Spain, and Aetolia. 
Through his service he eventually attained the rank of first centurion 
of his corps, (Livy, XLII, 34). While this Ligustinus served roughly 150 
years earlier than a soldier in Caesar’s army, as stated above, the 
Roman military was fairly conservative, and the same benefits of 
conquest could be expected in the Gallic Wars. Furthermore, Caesar 
actually raised the payment soldiers were granted from 120 denarii to 
225, only adding to the benefits of soldiering. 
What escapes many people when considering battles of the 
ancient world is that every individual soldier was prone to taking his 
own course of action in the combat, based on what he heard, felt, and 
saw. As Phang says, 
“Roman formations in battle and on the march were 
maintained by officers’ exhortation and coercion; by soldiers 
following the standards; and by the honor and courage of 
endurance and the shamefulness of flight,” (Phang, 38). 
If soldiers gave in to the temptation to act according to their 
senses rather than the orders of their superiors, they were not only 
disobeying the higher command, but were throwing themselves into 
defeat. It was this unbridled and independent type of action on the 
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part of the men that led to the shameful defeat at Gergovia, at least 
according to Caesar’s account.  
Taking all of this information to the battle of Alesia, Caesar 
says in 7.80 that he posted his men on both walls at a calculated 
distance to avoid confusion as to posting and responsibility. Every 
man was expected to know and do his duty. These legionaries would 
therefore have had a good view of the overall situation on one side of 
the hill and wall. This, however, does not really get across what these 
legionaries probably felt during the battle. A man facing Alesia could 
watch the Gauls streaming out of the Oppidum, running the course of 
the hill towards the siege-works, getting caught and impaled or 
maimed by the traps, showered with projectiles, and finally struggling 
up the glacis and wall to the waiting Romans. It should be noted, 
though, that in a few instances, such as that of the 60,000 men picked 
for the assault on the most vulnerable point in the walls, the Gauls 
were charging downhill, giving them accelerated speed and improved 
range for their own projectiles. But while his eyes would certainly be 
transfixed upon all the things happening in front of him, in the back of 
his head, in many instances he would hear the sound of violence 
behind him; a fight he could not directly influence. The same can be 
said of the legionary facing out towards the plain of modern-day 
Venarey-Les-Laumes. Caesar even writes about this, saying in 7.84, 
Multum ad terrendos nostros valet clamor, qui 
post tergum pugnantibus exstitit, quod suum periculum 
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in aliena vident salute constare: omnia enim plerumque 
quae absunt vehementius hominum mentes perturbant. 
 “The clamor caused us much fear, which arose 
behind our fighters, because they saw their own danger 
was to be decided by the valor of others: for generally, 
all things that are not present perturb the minds of men 
more vehemently.” 
 
It is also important to remember that the Romans rarely fought 
a defensive siege battle. Caesar’s conquests in Gaul had mostly 
consisted of open field battles along with sieges, in which pillaging and 
raping the hostile city was as much a part of battle as the fighting. 
Although they were certainly accustomed to building and defending 
castra, or camps, these siege-works are on an exponentially larger 
scale. Caesar’s men are in relatively unchartered territory, then, 
having to practice a combat style they were not accustomed to. 
Wherever a soldier was stationed, he was probably only 
familiar with his area—his stretch of rampart, plain, and horizon. All 
else was not his duty to know, as Caesar’s discipline instilled. 
Therefore, the soldiers on the eastern ramparts might have only come 
to know the danger to the entire army through dispatches from the 
west or calls for reinforcements. 
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It would have been a relatively different story for the cavalry of 
Caesar’s army, though. Having spent time outside the walls ranging 
for forage and fighting skirmishes with the Gallic reinforcement 
cavalry, they would have felt surer of their environment and their 
ability to navigate it. One could also suggest that because most of the 
Roman cavalry was Germanic, they would have appeared very similar 
to Gallic cavalry, perhaps only with the difference of having the left 
shoulder bare, as was the denotation of a Gaul friendly to Caesar’s 
forces. This would have perhaps allowed for greater scouting abilities. 
Therefore, the mental map of the cavalry would likely have been 
almost akin to Caesar’s, as they helped to create his map and 
intelligence. The cavalry, unlike the infantry, could have had a better 
idea of the overall shape and progression of the siege, then, because 
they might have gone over the hill in the days before the battle where 
Vercassivellaunus was attacking. They had ranged around the 
entirety of the siege-works looking for food, and thus knew the area. 
So the German cavalry, not the elite Romans who often served in the 
Roman cavalry, were Caesar’s eyes and ears. In fact, this could be a 
principal reason they were able to flank the Gauls for the decisive 
charge of the battle while Caesar, if we trust his account, was engaged 
in the front lines of the battle. They were confident in their 
relationship to the space of Alesia, and were therefore able to 
manipulate it more fully, even without Caesar’s direct command. 
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With this usable knowledge, however, also comes the 
knowledge of just how bad the Roman position actually was. As 
principal foragers and scouts, the cavalry would have seen how 
depleted the food supply was becoming and how once the Gallic 
reinforcements arrived, they might be able to squeeze off Roman 
access to the Ose and Oserain Rivers through the construction of 
dams. Combining this with the numerical advantage the Gallic 
reinforcements were adding to the battle, the outlook of the cavalry 
could become bleak indeed, an outlook which would only bleed into the 
rank and file legionaries as rumors and intelligence filtered through 
the camps. 
In sum, the average Roman soldier, while having a relative 
degree of control over his interactions with his personal space, did not 
have much control over his environment. He was trapped between the 
Gauls of Vercingetorix and those of Commius and Vercassivellaunus, 
and was totally dependent on Caesar’s ability to manipulate the space 
and forces of Alesia. 
The Defenses of Alesia: How the Vir shapes his 
Environment 
Throughout Book VII of de Bello Gallico and culminating in the 
final battle of Rome and Gaul, man’s ability to shape his environment 
emerges as a key theme. As Riggsby states, there are three stages in 
the technological warfare of the Gallic Campaigns, saying,  
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“In the first (phase) (Books 1 and 2), Rome’s 
enemies are overwhelmed by superior technology, to 
which they have nothing even to compare. When native 
devices are mentioned, they are strikingly primitive, not 
well distinguished from nature. In the middle of the 
work (Books 3 through 6), Roman technology remains 
superior, but its effects are not nearly so spectacular. 
Gallic technology becomes dramatically better, largely 
through piecemeal appropriation of Roman techniques. 
The final phase is constituted by Book 7 alone. Here we 
see, in a sense, improvement on both sides, as well as 
the most direct confrontations of technology in the book. 
The Romans remain superior, but the position is now 
vastly more complicated,” (Riggsby, 73-74).  
This final contest of technology and environment manipulation 
is Alesia. Here the Gauls are defensively lodged in their prebuilt 
oppidum of stone, while the Romans have utterly dominated their 
environment in the construction of 25 miles of glacis and palisade. 
They have dug a new channel joining the rivers Ose and Oserain, cut 
down thousands of trees, and replaced the green meadows and 
cultivated fields of wheat with muddy ground torn and split by the 
continual trod of hoof and heel. So, while Caesar has shown the Gauls 
more capable of using warfare technology in Book VII, he has also 
  
52 
shown that his technology is the masterclass; that Roman ingenuity 
means the mastery of physical space. 
However, we do see that technology and Roman ingenuity are 
not the absolute saviors at Alesia. As we are told in the battle scenes 
of Book VII, things get pretty touch-and-go for the Romans. 7.85 tells 
us that the picked men under Vercassivellaunus “threw earth on to 
the defenses, which gave the Gauls a means of ascent as well as 
covering the devices which the Romans had hidden in the ground. Our 
men were now running out of weapons and of strength.” In this 
situation, the might of Caesar’s walls are perilously close to being 
overcome; the ‘altae moenia Romae’ nearly taken. Therefore it is up to 
traditional Roman will and might to win the battle and, by extension, 
the campaign. As has been discussed, Caesar obliges by first sending 
Labienus to the critical gap in the lines, then going himself to ensure 
that victory is achieved. He presents his men as faithful and sturdy, 
even more so than the walls they have toiled over in the days leading 
up to the battle, all of which rests on his own personal sturdiness, 
shich, in turn, reflects his special relationship to the gods, or his 
pietas. This victory represents, therefore, more than just Roman 
technology and adaptability; it represents Rome’s, and by extension, 
Caesar’s unwavering fortitude and strength. 
 
Conclusions: A Cracked Door and Many Open Windows 
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In the end, what is there to say about Caesar that has not 
already been said? What is there still to learn? This thesis was written 
to breathe new life into that daring man who risked everything, 
including life and limb, just to see himself sitting atop it all when it 
was over—and new skepticism into his account of the war in Gaul. 
Julius Caesar was extraordinarily cunning politically and militarily, 
and his writings show it. With the aid of the modern technology that 
allows the visualization of large-scale terrain in real time, we have 
been able to dive into Caesar’s account in a way as of yet untried and 
to try to catch a glimpse into his mind, mapping out his emotions, 
motivations, and decisions, all in an attempt to shine light on the 
several areas left less illuminated in the Commentarii de Bello 
Gallico.  
 However, the story neither begins nor ends at Alesia for 
Caesar, and it should not for students of the leader and de Bello 
Gallico, either. The digital world of hyper-reality has multiple 
possibilities for changing the way we think about ancient strategy, 
combat, and perhaps most importantly, manipulation of space. 
Sending the student to fight for or against the Gauls in a game is far 
more memorable than sending them home to read the account and 
then to regurgitate it on a written exam. And Alesia, although it was 
the end of the literary Gallic Wars, can be a beginning for students 
with no prior knowledge of the campaigns, sparking their interest in 
the Gallic Wars, the Roman military, or the life of Caesar. I have 
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made a start with the Siege of Alesia, but the rest of the Gallic 
campaigns remains, in a sense, an undiscovered country, waiting to be 
explored through the digital platform of hyper-reality. Through such 
hyper-real platforms, we could create a number of perspective shifts 
regarding Caesar’s actions, motivations, and how he reports his 
events. It is the hope of this project to begin that trend of perspective 
shift, and to encourage others to carry on this journey of illumination 
of Caesar and his men, who have been, despite centuries of study, 





Figure 1- View from Mt. de Flavigny to the Northwest corner of the 
defensives, allowing for a view to the Les-Laumes plain. If Caesar 
ordered the cavalry charge, it was most likely from here. Screenshot, 
Alesia application. 
 
Figure 2- View from the critical juncture where Vercassivellaunus 
attacked. If Caesar was here, he most likely would not have been able 





Figure 3- View from the western-most point of the Gallic oppidum. 
Vercingetorix would have held this view, and could therefore have 
seen much more than Caesar. Screenshot, Alesia application. 
 
 
Figure 4- Photo from the oppidum looking to the site of the western 





Figure 5- Photo from the western Roman defenses to the oppidum. 
Photo by Tom McMahon. 
 
 
Figure 6- View from Gallic reinforcement camp looking eastward 






Figure 7- Diagram of the various Roman traps on either side 
of the walls (Edwards, 630).  
 
 
Figure 8- Actual stimuli found on the field at Alise-Sainte-
Reine. Photo by Tom McMahon. 
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Figure 9- The three types of ditches employed by the 
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